

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
N DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 5 August 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

(United States of America)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO  
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV  
Mr. D. KOSTOV  
Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA  
U NAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. R. KLEIN  
Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij M. IMRU  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. T. BEKELE

India:

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Mr. O.O. ADESOLA

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

Mr. G.K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. A. SAHAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT

Sir Harold BEELEY

Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. P.S. BRIDGES

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the two hundred and twenty-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Today, 5 August, is the second anniversary of the signing of the limited nuclear test-ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) in Moscow. I think it would be appropriate that notice be taken of this by the Conference, and a statement has been suggested reading as follows:

"Two years ago today the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was signed by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Since that time more than a hundred nations have joined the original signatories.

"On the second anniversary of that achievement we consider more urgent than ever further progress on disarmament measures."

If there is no objection to the Conference's taking note of this anniversary in that form, I suggest that the statement be included as a part of today's communiqué.

It was so decided.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I think it very appropriate that the Chairman has reminded the Eighteen-Nation Committee of the anniversary of the signing of the 1963 Moscow Treaty. It must be pointed out that today is also another anniversary. the twentieth anniversary of the dropping of the first atom bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That on the one hand, and the fact that since then nuclear weapons have become several thousand times more powerful and dangerous than the Hiroshima bomb, do indeed remind us of the sad truth that no advantage was taken of the excellent atmosphere created in the world two years ago. One is bound to agree that this places upon us an additional obligation: to set about carrying out our main task in earnest and without delay.

Before coming to my statement today, I should like to make a preliminary observation. At this session the same attempt has been made as in the past to suggest to the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee that they have assembled

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merely for friendly talks on disarmament in an ivory tower where it is out of place to say anything about world events, even though these have the most direct bearing on the work of the Committee. Permit me, therefore, to begin by stating that we are resolutely opposed to the tactics of hushing up the truth which are concealed behind those suggestions.

No evil can be overcome if its roots are not exposed. That is why we cannot take into consideration the displeasure of those who resent the exposure of the West German revenge-seekers, those who "do not see" either the atomic or the territorial claims of the Bonn leaders, those who do not hear the statements made by the minister Schroeder or his colleague Seebohm, or Bonn's official claims to the "frontiers of 1937". We cannot agree for the sake of politeness to accept it as the truth that the people of South Viet Nam, for instance, have committed aggression against themselves, or that the troops of the United States of America are waging in the Dominican Republic an armed struggle against someone's aggression, or that the Eighteen-Nation Committee cannot and must not deal with such unpleasant matter if it wishes to be successful in its work. To paraphrase the words of an ancient Greek sage: a good atmosphere is a useful thing, but it is even more useful to speak the truth no matter how bitter it may be.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is indeed resuming its work at the present time in an atmosphere incomparably worse than it has ever been since the beginning of its work in the spring of 1962. The leaders of one of the States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee -- that is, the United States of America -- have openly proclaimed the "right", invented by themselves, to approve or disapprove the internal regimes of other States some of which are thousands of miles distant from United States territory. Of course, the United States cannot assert this so-called "right" except by force of arms, as is shown by its recent actions in the Congo, the Dominican Republic and Viet Nam.

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The armed aggression of the United States Government against the Vietnamese people is gradually spreading and is creating a serious threat to the peace and security of the peoples of South-East Asia and the whole world. The actions of the United States troops in South Viet Nam are causing enormous destruction, indescribable sufferings and death. The United States Air Force and Navy are carrying out criminal attacks on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, bombing peaceful villages, industrial targets, hospitals, schools and historical monuments in gross violation of the principles and standards of international law and the most elementary notions of humanity.

It is not difficult to realize - and indeed it is realized throughout the world, including the United States - that the sole reason for the waging of this American war against the whole of Viet Nam is that the United States wishes, in violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954, to perpetuate the division of Viet Nam and to convert Viet Nam into a United States colony and military base in order to secure for itself the possibility of dictating its will to the peoples of all South-East Asia. That is why the policy of the United States Government is arousing justified and increasing indignation among the peoples of the whole world.

The particular danger of the present tension in the international situation lies in the fact that the policy of so-called "military escalation" which is being carried out by the United States, not without the support of some of its allies, means that the path leading to a world thermo-nuclear war is being taken. There is no doubt that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would work in a more favourable atmosphere if the concept of "escalation" were used, for example, to determine the progress of man in the conquest and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, or gradually to carry out measures aimed at strengthening confidence among the peoples and consolidating peace and security, rather than to designate a rising scale of adventurous actions and war.

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In the present international situation the need arises in a particularly urgent manner for the Committee to adopt concrete, practical disarmament measures immediately. The dangerous development of events in the world urgently requires the Eighteen-Nation Committee to concentrate its attention on solving the most pressing and topical problems underlying the international tension. The Committee can and must take concrete decisions and thus contribute to a relaxation of international tension. It is particularly important, in the opinion of the Bulgarian delegation, to take a decision on the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. Foreign military bases and troops on the territories of other States are in fact one of the main sources of international conflicts and of tension in the relations between States, and involve a great menace to the cause of peace.

A struggle between the old and the new is going on everywhere in one form or another. But it is only where interference from outside takes place that international complications arise. The latest events in Viet Nam have shown once again the real purpose of foreign military bases and troops on the territories of other countries. What the imperialists are now doing in Viet Nam can be repeated in other parts of the world if the necessary measures are not taken in good time to eliminate these bases and to withdraw the foreign troops to within their own national confines. Obviously, unless the aforesaid measures are carried out, it is difficult to imagine any kind of disarmament. The peoples of the world demand that an end be put to the bastions of imperialism and to the policy of blackmail and war psychosis, which are preventing the establishment of a lasting peace and the practical implementation of disarmament. We take the view that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should consider this question as a matter of urgency.

Obviously, the question of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons also deserves special attention and calls for an urgent solution. Any delay in this matter could lead to a situation in which, as has been stressed here by many speakers, nuclear weapons would be found in the possession of a whole number of



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governments, and the solution of this problem would become impossible or, at least, additional obstacles would arise that would be difficult to overcome. It is impossible, however, to seek for this solution along the lines proposed by the Western Powers. What, in substance, have they proposed and are now proposing to us? They propose to make compatible that which is incompatible: namely, to create in one form or another a NATO multilateral nuclear force and to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. The real aim of such a proposal is no secret to anyone: its aim is to satisfy the desire and ambition of the West German revanchists to gain access to nuclear weapons.

It is obvious that the Committee cannot agree to such an approach, because in solving this important question it is essential to start out from the basic idea that both direct and indirect access to nuclear weapons must be barred completely to all non-nuclear Powers, including the Federal Republic of Germany. If the Committee adopts this approach, it will mean that it has taken a path which is right in principle and which is approved by the great majority of countries and world public opinion. Any other path is fraught with grave dangers.

The intentions of the Bonn Government in regard to plans for a multilateral force or an Atlantic nuclear force or any other plans of this kind are to obtain for the West German militarists the means to carry out an adventurous nuclear policy through which they hope to redraw the map of Europe. Naturally these aims are zealously concealed by the West German revanchists behind various "theories", relating to security, equal military rights and so on. In West Germany it is even asserted that the possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary attribute of the national sovereignty and that this makes it "necessary" for the Federal Republic of Germany to become a nuclear Power. It is hardly necessary to prove the complete lack of foundation of such a "concept", if one may call it that. Suffice it to say that if all countries were to adopt such a---save the mark! -- "theory", it would mean the start of a mad race for nuclear weapons and the complete negation of the possibility of putting an end to the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

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The majority of the countries in the world are opposed to the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form, whether direct or indirect. As is well known, the conference of non-aligned countries which took place in Cairo in October 1964 requested the great Powers:

".....to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons.....among those States which do not at present possess them." (A/5763, p.22) Disregarding that appeal, however, the Western Powers are in fact urgently seeking a way of giving access to nuclear weapons to the West German revanchists.

Most recently, in order to justify this policy, the argument is being used that the non-nuclear Powers need "guarantees"; but it appears that only the Federal Republic of Germany needs "guarantees" through participation in a multilateral nuclear force. Guarantees against nuclear war are needed by the whole of mankind, and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is one of those guarantees. But the most reliable safeguard is to do away with these weapons completely and for ever. Resurrected West German militarism is not seeking a guarantee in that direction, although Germany is prohibited from possessing weapons for aggression by the Potsdam Agreement, the twentieth anniversary of which occurred a few days ago, and by the formal commitments assumed by the Bonn Government itself, and also by the spirit of the Moscow Treaty of 5 August 1963, the second anniversary of which falls today.

The Bulgarian delegation considers that the taking of decisive measures against the further spread of nuclear weapons should be on such a basis as would preclude the possibility of carrying out an "atomic Munich" policy. The experience of history has shown the danger of a policy of appeasement towards German militarism. The rebirth of this policy -- the new plans for transferring nuclear weapons to the West German Bundeswehr -- bodes no good for the world.

The growing threat of a thermo-nuclear war also gives urgency to the question of considering and solving with all speed the problem of banning the use of nuclear weapons. More than three and a half years have elapsed since the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear

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and thermo-nuclear weapons (A/RES/1653 (XVI)). Unfortunately, so far no agreement has been reached on this question despite the efforts of the socialist and non-aligned countries, and despite the fact that those who oppose the convening of a conference on the prohibition of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons are unable to adduce any convincing arguments in support of their negative position. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches great importance to the proposal to conclude a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons (A/RES/1909 (XVII); ENDC/139) and to the proposal that, even before the signing of such a convention, the nuclear Powers should declare that they assume an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. We welcome the readiness expressed by the Soviet Union to assume this undertaking on the strict condition that the other nuclear Powers do likewise. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would help to improve the international atmosphere, and would be an important step towards the elimination of these weapons and an undoubted success for the whole cause of disarmament.

On the initiative of the non-aligned countries, the United Nations Commission on Disarmament has recommended to the General Assembly of the United Nations (DC/224; ENDC/149) the urgent consideration of the question of convening a world conference on disarmament, in which all the countries of the world would participate. Undoubtedly this initiative stands for something positive. A world conference on disarmament could support the efforts to begin the process of general and complete disarmament.

We believe that the lack of results from the Committee's activities hitherto should not be underestimated. The time has come for the delegations of certain countries to stop regarding the Committee as a forum merely for expressing the desire for peace, where endless discussions are to be carried on, as if disarmament were almost a matter for the remote future; and to recognize instead that the Committee is intended to be a workmanlike body for the purpose of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

The prospects for the success of the present negotiations depend in the first place on the intentions with which the Western countries have sent their delegations here, and on whether they are going to show a genuine readiness to conclude mutually-acceptable agreements or are going to continue to cling stubbornly to their old negative positions. If one is to judge from the statements made so far in the Committee by the Western representatives, one gets the impression that they are

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repeating their old proposals, although it is well known that these proposals did not contribute in the least degree to the achievement of progress in the disarmament negotiations. Such an approach towards the acute and pressing problems of disarmament cannot give rise to any optimism.

It must be said quite frankly that, in the face of the impending danger of war, proposals like the one to transfer part of existing fissionable materials to peaceful purposes (ENDC/120) cannot even be called a palliative. Of course one should not be a maximalist, but the times in which we are living compel us to adopt even the most modest practical approach in order to carry out the task of stopping immediately -- today and not tomorrow -- the drift towards war which we are all witnessing.

The Bulgarian delegation does not consider it necessary to dwell in detail at today's meeting on all the problems before our Committee. We fully share the views expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, and fully support the proposals of the Soviet delegation. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria will continue in future to co-operate to the best of its ability with all those who genuinely desire to conclude such agreements as would help towards reducing international tension and would facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament -- which is the constant aim of the Government of my country and of the whole Bulgarian people.

The worsening of the international situation has galvanized all peace-loving forces and aroused them to fight with even greater energy to end the imperialist aggression in Viet Nam and in other parts of the world, and to preserve peace throughout the world. The latest events eloquently show that the greater the danger of a thermo-nuclear war, the more resolutely the peoples oppose it. This has been confirmed in particular by the World Congress for peace, national independence and general disarmament held in Helsinki, which appealed -

".....to all peoples for action to end the armaments race and to implement practical measures of disarmament, to demand the dismantling of military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, and concrete measures for security in all the world and for the peaceful settlement of disputes."

Our Committee, whose main task is to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament, cannot turn a deaf ear to this appeal, which expresses the deep yearning of the peoples to live in peace and friendship.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation is very happy to be resuming work in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament after an unfortunately long lapse in our sessions. We hope that the Committee will speed up and bring to a conclusion its general debate, the main purpose of which, as we see it, is to allow delegations to give their views on the general situation in disarmament negotiations and to offer suggestions on how this Committee can best go ahead with its work -- what, in fact, that work is to be for the next month or so.

The Canadian delegation believes that we are here primarily as a result of resolution DC/225(ENDC/149) of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which expressed the wish of the great majority of the Members of the United Nations that this Committee should resume its work -- and work harder and more effectively than in the past. I think that most of us agree that the recent meeting in New York of the United Nations Disarmament Commission provided a useful opportunity for a broad review of disarmament problems, particularly since there was no opportunity last autumn to discuss disarmament in the General Assembly. The proposal in resolution DC/224(ibid) of the United Nations Disarmament Commission for a world disarmament conference is clearly one which requires the most careful study. That suggestion is of considerable interest to my Government, and I hope to be able to say something further when there is a suitable opportunity. No doubt the subject will be much discussed during the private contacts between delegations here, which are one of the most useful features of our sessions.

In operative paragraph 2(a) of resolution DC/225 we are requested to resume our efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament. At our 1964 sessions we devoted about half our time to discussion of general and complete disarmament, and in particular the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles. Unfortunately it has been clear for some time that the prospects for early progress in this sector of the disarmament problem are not particularly encouraging. As our session may have to be rather short, it can be argued that the question of general and complete disarmament could best be left aside for the present with the idea of using the available time for considering problems holding greater promise of early resolution. If, however,

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the majority of the Committee considers that we should continue to devote regular meetings to general and complete disarmament during this current session, the Canadian delegation will certainly raise no objection. However, the question of the reduction and elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles was debated extensively during our session last year with little indication that a narrowing of differences could be expected. Unless it can be shown that the positions of either side have changed, my delegation would hope that we could agree to turn to other items under the general heading of general and complete disarmament upon which our time might be more usefully spent.

As for collateral measures, I hope we shall be able to agree to concentrate our attention on a small number of specific topics whose discussion holds most promise of useful results. We consider that the Committee ought to follow the recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in its resolution DC/225, in which it proposed that priority should be given to consideration of an agreement on non-proliferation and the question of extending the nuclear test ban.

My delegation shares the view of the majority: namely, that the problem of non-proliferation is the most urgent matter now before us. It has been amply demonstrated once again in recent months how easily small wars can grow into bigger ones. It is not difficult to imagine the major new complications which will result if the trend towards further proliferation of nuclear weapons remains unchecked. At the same time it became apparent in the debate in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and elsewhere that some non-nuclear nations may be reluctant to renounce the right to acquire a nuclear military status in the absence of positive arrangements to satisfy their legitimate need for security. The problem of non-dissemination will not be settled quickly or easily, but I think it is one in which some progress might be made if we were to apply ourselves to it diligently.

In Canada we have been studying this question very carefully during the past winter and spring. Our study was directed towards the possibility of producing a draft treaty which could be laid on the table at this Conference. During our previous sessions several delegations have advocated this approach in order to concentrate thinking and define issues in specific language.

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Authorities of other countries have been working on the same lines as we have. The Canadian delegation joins in the hope expressed in the message from the Right Honourable Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom:

"... that a draft treaty will be put forward at an early meeting of this Committee and that it will be given the most urgent and sympathetic consideration." (ENDC/PV.219, p.7)

It should be within our abilities to produce such a draft as will achieve a large measure of support and will aid us to come to grips with the problem of how to stop the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. Representatives will recall that the United Nations Disarmament Commission said, in the sixth preambular paragraph of its resolution DC/225, that it was -

"Convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences".  
(ENDC/149)

The "serious consequences" were spelt out by Lord Chalfont, the representative of the United Kingdom, when he said:

"In an attempt to stop the spread of nuclear weapons we are not dealing simply with one of the possible approaches to disarmament. If we fail in this, if we are forced into a world in which nuclear weapons are accepted as casually and readily as rifles and tanks are accepted now, we may find that every road leading to disarmament and a peaceful world is finally and irrevocably blocked."  
(ENDC/PV.219, p.8)

Mr. Foster, the representative of the United States, told us:

"The United States recommends that this session engage in a renewed and intensive effort to achieve a mutually-acceptable treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. ... A non-proliferation agreement could be the beginning of increased security for all States. Indeed, while turning our attention to the problem of proliferation we must also consider the security of nations that forgo nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.218, p.11)

The other question which the United Nations Disarmament Commission recommended that this Committee should consider as a matter of priority is that of extending the scope of the partial test-ban treaty to cover underground tests. Mr. Foster told us

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that, in spite of improvements in scientific methods of detecting seismic events and in the ability to discriminate between earthquakes and underground explosions, there will still be a significant number of natural events occurring each year which have signals indistinguishable from those of an explosion. Therefore, according to the best advice of United States scientists, some events will occur which might be nuclear explosions, and it can only be proved for certain that they were not by a visit to the site of the indeterminate event. Mr. Foster invited other countries to submit any data or research results which could be helpful in efforts to determine what would constitute an adequate system for verifying that all parties to a ban on underground nuclear testing were complying with their obligations.

Lord Chalfont, the representative of the United Kingdom, said:

"Our scientists still believe that some on-site inspection is necessary, but they are ready to be convinced that it is not.

"Soviet scientists are able, we are told, to detect and identify all underground nuclear explosions without fail. If that is so, it seems to us, as to so many other delegations who spoke on this subject in New York, that the obviously sensible course is to allow Western and Soviet scientists to meet to produce an agreed technical assessment of current detection and identification capabilities." (ENDC/PV.219, p.10)

In the preamble of the United Nations Disarmament Commission's resolution DC/225 it is stated that the joint memorandum of 14 September 1964 (ENDC/145) submitted to this Committee by the non-aligned delegations "represents a fair and sound basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the remaining differences for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty". I should like to cite briefly what was said by non-aligned delegations in that memorandum. After referring to the differences between the nuclear Powers "on the question of identification and need for verification of underground tests", the eight non-aligned countries urged them "to take all immediate steps towards an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests and to discontinue all such tests". They continued:



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"Such steps could, in their view, be facilitated by the exchange of scientific and other information between the nuclear Powers or by the improvement of detection and identification techniques, if necessary".

In their memoranda (ENDC/144), also dated 14 September 1964, briefly summarizing suggestions or proposals made by each delegation during 1964, the eight non-aligned delegations made a number of further comments on that point. The Brazilian delegation said it thought it possible to study an immediate ban on underground tests capable of detection and identification by national systems. Scientific data would be necessary for the study of that possibility. If the Committee did not accept the idea of studying this information itself, it could refer it to a technical sub-committee appointed for the purpose.

Burma suggested a reactivation of the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

The Indian delegation held more or less the same views as Brazil on the banning of underground tests above a limited threshold, and thought it might be necessary for nuclear Powers to exchange scientific and other data to achieve this.

Mexico and Ethiopia urged the cessation of underground tests but did not specify any particular procedure to be followed in the negotiation.

Nigeria suggested reactivation of the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, possibly with the participation of scientific experts. Nigeria also requested the nuclear Powers to make available the results of the research carried out by them over the past year with regard to underground tests.

Sweden suggested the setting up of ad hoc informal working parties for exchange of views on technical questions, and presumably this would include technical questions in relation to a nuclear test ban.

The United Arab Republic held the same views as Brazil and India on banning underground tests above a limited threshold and developed the desirability of exchanging scientific information and achieving scientific co-operation under the formula suggested by it.

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It will be seen from this résumé that the majority of the non-aligned delegations here favoured an exchange of scientific information in a sub-committee, or under some other arrangement, in order to determine the feasibility of a ban or partial ban on underground tests.

The extracts I have quoted from the statements made by the representatives of the Western nuclear Powers show their readiness to negotiate on the two subjects which the United Nations Disarmament Commission specially recommended for priority treatment. What did we hear from Mr. Tsarapkin, the Soviet representative? We heard a speech (ENDC/PV.220) which struck me, when he was delivering it, as being of a rather schizophrenic character, or as if it had been written by two different authors. Part of it related to disarmament, it is true; but the other part, and the more emphatically delivered part was a denunciation of the actions of the United States in various parts of the world, on which the Soviet Union sticks its label "aggressive". The Soviet definition of aggression, it seems to the Canadian delegation, is simply any action taken by or in aid of legitimate governments to resist communist-inspired armed attack. "Cet animal est très méchant: quand on l'attaque, il se défend."

The Canadian delegation does not wish to engage in controversy over the events in Viet Nam or elsewhere which were catalogued by the Soviet delegation and repeated today by the Bulgarian representative in his statement. The United Nations Disarmament Commission did not call on this Committee to meet here to discuss those subjects, crucially important though they are; and certainly the United Nations Disarmament Commission was exposed to a sufficient dose of that kind of argument during its meetings. No doubt, if it had thought we should discuss those subjects, it would have been capable of saying so. Our duty here, according to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is to discuss ways in which the violence which is unfortunately endemic in the world today can be made less dangerous, less liable to erupt into a nuclear war. That means for us the discussion of measures of disarmament, and measures for the reduction of international tension and the limitation and reduction of armaments. We are not just to discuss them like a debating society, but to prepare the way for effective international agreements.

We have not found very much to agree with in the two statements with the Soviet representative has made here; but we can agree with what he said at the end of his statement as Chairman on the first day of our renewed session:

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"Of course, we may be asked: why then has the Eighteen-Nation Committee met? Will it be able to achieve anything positive in these unfavourable circumstances of a worsening of the international situation? Hardly anyone will deny that it is precisely at this anxious moment that increased efforts should be made in every direction in order to prevent any further menacing development of events in the world, to replace the policy of war with a policy of peace, and to reach agreement on practicable measures for disarmament and relaxation in international relations.

"Time does not wait. Delay is very dangerous. It is essential that the Committee should, without further procrastination, adopt concrete decisions both on the problem of general and complete disarmament and on measures aimed at limiting the arms race and reducing tension in international relations. The Committee has before it more than enough proposals on that score. The Committee must begin to act and stop marking time." (ENDC/PV.218, p.8)

In spite of those words, to which we think no one will take exception, when we listened to the Soviet representative's speech on 3 August (ENDC/PV.220), we found nothing which would encourage us to think that he had come here prepared to negotiate seriously on a non-dissemination treaty, or on extending the Moscow test-ban treaty to include underground tests. He merely repeated the inflexible old formulae which we had been hearing all through our 1964 sessions.

As to a non-dissemination agreement, he continued to make it seem as if the sole purpose of that measure should be to prevent the Federal Republic of Germany from obtaining access to nuclear weapons. We must remark in passing that we have never had a definition of precisely what the Soviet representative means when he speaks of "access". The Soviet representative took the occasion to deliver another of his attacks on the alleged warlike intentions of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany; and a similar attack was delivered this morning by the Bulgarian representative. While the emotions still aroused by the events of twenty years ago are understandable, it is time, in the interests of peace in Europe, to put them aside. The facts are that today it is not the armament of the Federal Republic of Germany which does -- or conceivably could -- constitute a threat to the Soviet Union but the converse. The Soviet Union has twenty armoured and motorized divisions, in

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the highest state of war-readiness, on the soil of East Germany. And it has many hundreds of medium-range and intermediate-range nuclear-headed ballistic missiles in the Baltic areas and other western parts of the Soviet Union targeted on points in the Federal Republic of Germany.

It must be a principle of any stable arrangement for the prevention of dissemination -- that is, the avoidance of any more nations becoming nuclear Powers -- that those countries which undertake not to make nuclear weapons, or otherwise acquire control over them, should have some assurances for the future that they will have a degree of security against nuclear attack. Naturally, this would apply as much to the Federal Republic of Germany as to any other non-nuclear State.

Herr Schroeder, the German Foreign Minister, said in the course of an interview with the Westdeutsche Zeitung on 3 July this year:

"In 1954 the Federal Republic renounced the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in its territory. This renunciation may well be regarded as a preparatory step to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is therefore no unjust claim if we ask other nations, which frequently demand complete renunciation of nuclear armament from us, first to reach this preparatory stage themselves by making renunciation similar to the one we made in 1954."

We hope that the Soviet delegation will not refuse to discuss the preparation of a draft treaty on non-dissemination. The Canadian delegation believes that the best way to ensure that dissemination does not take place -- dissemination to the Federal Republic of Germany as well as to other States which are not nuclear Powers -- is to prepare and sign such a treaty. The Western nuclear Powers which have proposed arrangements for the participation of the West European NATO partners in a deterrent force have time and again insisted that this force will not in any case lead to any of the non-nuclear participants in it becoming a nuclear Power. The Canadian delegation feels that there is an effective basis for negotiation on a draft treaty and hopes that the Soviet Union will be prepared to play its part in such a negotiation.

It is really quite incomprehensible to my delegation that the Soviet delegation should absolutely refuse what has been called for by so many of the delegations here represented: that is, to have the question of the limits of detection

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

and identification of underground tests discussed in a group with the benefit of scientific advice. The allegation that this would result in drowning the question in a sea of technicalities can hardly convince anybody. The technical discussions should go on under the basic direction of the political representatives here, and it would be up to the political representatives to see that the scientific advisers presented their advice as scientists within a limited period of time. In the opinion of the Canadian delegation, it is not receiving the advice of scientists which would cause delay. The resolution of this question has been delayed for two years now by the political refusal of the Soviet Union to demonstrate scientifically what it claims can be done: that is, the detection of all underground tests by agencies operating from their own national territories.

In closing, the Canadian delegation hopes that the Soviet delegation at future meetings will demonstrate an attitude which will make it possible to have effective negotiation on the subjects to which the United Nations Disarmament Commission recommended we should accord priority.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Before we conclude, I should like to raise in the Committee a point of order which was suggested to me by the statement of the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Lukanov. Mr. Lukanov did not have the advantages which I myself had of taking part in the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and is perhaps not well acquainted in detail with the way in which that work was carried out. If he will permit me, I should like to give him some explanations and information concerning that work or, at least, concerning the way in which my delegation sees it.

The meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission was requested by the Soviet Government for the purpose of giving instructions and directives to our Committee. Those directives are contained in a resolution which Mr. Burns has just quoted -- resolution DC/225 (ENDC/149). They are clear and specific. That was the only resolution adopted by the Commission by a very large majority and without opposition.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Now Mr. Lukanov, this morning, not only served up the usual ration of criticism and attacks in regard to the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of the United States of America and the Western countries in general, but when he finally came to say something also about disarmament, he dwelt on certain questions which certainly relate to disarmament but which are not at all comprised in the relevant resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission.

He spoke to us on the question of a world disarmament conference which was certainly the subject of a resolution of the Commission (DC/224: ibid); but that resolution was addressed not to our Committee but to the next session of the General Assembly.

He also spoke to us on the question of convening a conference for the purpose of banning nuclear weapons. That too -- I should like to point out to him -- is a question which was the subject of a draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation in New York (DC/219), but nothing came of that proposal and it was not voted on by the Commission, because the Soviet delegation, in a gesture which we much appreciated, was good enough to withdraw it.

I think, therefore, that if the Committee wishes to do useful work in the certainly limited time at its disposal, it must concentrate on the matters that are referred to us by resolution DC/225, adopted by the Commission by a large majority and without opposition, as I have said.

I reserve the right to revert in more detail to the question of the work of the Commission in New York and the influence which it is bound to have on our own work here, because I consider it important. But I wanted to draw the Chairman's attention to this point of order now.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I have asked to speak in order to reply briefly to the statement made by the representative of Italy. His statement can be taken to mean that he is trying to set the work of the Committee within some sort of rigid framework which seems to him to be very appropriate but with which other delegations, I think, cannot agree. There is no point in doing that. In the first place, the questions referred to by various speakers, and in particular by the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Lukanov, fall within the terms of reference of this Committee; secondly, the questions which were dealt with in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Commission (DC/219) were not withdrawn by us -- you were present there, Mr. Cavalletti,

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

and you know that we merely did not press for vote on that draft; it still exists as an official document, as a proposal of the Soviet Union.

In general I should like to say that we think it would be wrong and that there would be serious consequences for our Conference on the whole if we were to attempt to squeeze into a rigid framework the questions or problems which we consider it necessary to discuss here, especially as the questions referred to just now by the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Lukanov, fall within the competence of our Committee and have been submitted by one or another delegation for the consideration of the Committee.

I think my reply fully answers the arguments which have just been advanced by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I call on the representative of Bulgaria, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I have asked to speak merely in order to thank Mr. Cavalletti for the clarification he has given me concerning the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. However, like the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, I cannot understand -- and I think nobody understands -- why Mr. Cavalletti thinks that the Commission in New York changed the character of the work of our Committee, that it had given some sort of new directives so that the Committee would cease to be what it has been hitherto and would now have some other task: "a plus b" period. I do not think Mr. Cavalletti meant that.

In regard to his general dissatisfaction, which was also expressed by Mr. Burns, at my having touched upon some questions which have not been directly entrusted to the Committee: it is true that our Committee has not been asked to solve the problem of Viet Nam, for instance, as the representative of Canada said. But the Committee cannot solve a single one of its problems unless it removes the obstacles, unless it proposes the elimination of what prevents it from taking decisions. Would anyone

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

deny that the events in Viet Nam are hindering our work today? I hardly think so. That is the point.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): The representative of Italy also would like to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): It is not our intention either to go outside the frame of the work of this Committee or to impose rigid limits upon it. What I meant -- and I insist on this concept -- was that we accepted the Soviet Government's proposal to convene the United Nations Disarmament Commission precisely because we thought that we should obtain from the work of that Commission directives and inspiration for our own work. Consequently I believe that, if we go beyond the terms of the actual resolution which has been addressed to us, we run the risk of wasting time in discussing matters not directly referred to our Committee by the Commission.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 221st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. William C. Foster, representative of the United States.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Canada, Italy and the Soviet Union.

"The Conference adopted the following statement:

"Two years ago today the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water <sup>1/</sup> was signed by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Since that time more than a hundred nations have joined the original signatories.

"On the second anniversary of that achievement we consider more urgent than ever further progress on disarmament measures."

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 10 August 1965, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.